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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between interests and justice 
in normative democratic theory. I tackle this issue from the point of view of the 
citizens, as I want to enquire which moral duties democratic citizenship implies. 
Ordinary citizens of current democratic societies are expected to endorse and act 
on a conception of justice, and normally political philosophers require that it be 
one belonging to a certain acceptable set. John Rawls is the most prominent 
example: contemporary democratic citizens share a reasonable conception of 
justice, which regulates the terms of their social cooperation. Nevertheless the 
liberal tradition, by focusing on individual freedoms and rights, tends to give 
priority to these aspects rather than to a public commitment towards a common 
good or a shared conception of justice. Do liberal theories of democracy need to 
give priority to a public allegiance over their interests? 
 First, I sketch a brief introduction in order to make clear the liberal 
paradigm within which the problem is handled. Second, I compare two positions 
as representatives of the “justice first” and “interest-based” approaches. First, I 
address the case of Rawls, who grounds his conception of citizenship on the idea 
of public reason and on the duty of civility. Relying on a morally oriented 
interpretation of the notion of reasonableness, I argue that, in Rawlsian 
democratic model, citizens are required to prioritize a publicly shared 
conception of justice with respect to their comprehensive doctrines and 
interests. Second, I analyze the case of Thomas Christiano, who grounds the 
justification of democracy on the idea of “equal advancement of interests”. In this 
model, citizens are encouraged to publicly discuss their interests and their broad 
moral considerations in order to find and further the common good. 
 In the last part I introduce my own proposal, which focuses on the 
relationship between an objective conception of interest and democratic 
deliberation, which appears to be greatly underestimated in the current 
normative debate on democracy.  Firstly, I distinguish between the notion of 
interest and the one of comprehensive moral values. Secondly, I separate it from 
a radically subjective interpretation of individual interest  (i.e. what I think to be 
in my interest) that cannot ground more than a strictly procedural conception of 
democracy, with little space for deliberation. On the contrary, an objective 
conception of interest has different assets. First, it does not restrain citizens to 
considerations of justice in the public space. Second, it allows for an epistemic 
interpretation of both the ideas of deliberation and of the common good. Third, 
contra pure deliberative theories, it secures a link to democracy, because, in case 
of irresolvable disagreement, it justifies recourse to majoritarian rule in order to 
make a decision. Finally, it has an intuitive and direct motivational effect, as it 
aims at providing citizens with reasons based on their rational interest to 
participate and comply with democratic procedures. 
